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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee/Plaintiff,

Case No. 20090538

v.

(INCARCERATED)

RICKY ANGILAU,
Appellant/Defendant.

ARGUMENTS

I.

THE DIRECT FILE STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
UNDER MOHL

The State argues as if the direct file statute mandated that prosecutors file
informations or indictments in adult court in cases involving 16 and 17 year olds charged
with murder or aggravated murder, and as if prosecutors have no discretion to proceed by
petition in juvenile court in such cases. See State's brief at 11 ("prosecution commences with
the mandatory filing of an information in the district court"). See also State's brief at 9, 2728, 31-32, 37-38. Neither the direct file statute nor any other provision of law requires
prosecutors to file informations or indictments, as opposed to juvenile court petitions, in
such cases. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701(l)(a)1 wkh Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-

!

The direct file statute provides in relevant part:
(1) The district court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all
persons 16 years of age or older charged by information or indictment with:
(a) an offense which would be murder or
1

702.2 Rather, prosecutors are free to file petitions in cases they deem appropriate.3
Thus, prosecutors continue to have discretion to charge a child in adult court or
juvenile court as was found to be unconstitutional in State v. Mohi 901 P.2d 991 (Utah
1995).4 Compare Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-25(6)(b) (1993) with Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-

aggravated murder if committed by an adult[.]
2

The Serious Youth Offender statute provides in relevant part:
(1) Any action filed by a county attorney, district attorney, or attorney
general charging a minor 16 years of age or older with a felony shall be by
criminal information and filed in the juvenile court if the information charges
any of the following offenses: ...
(Emphasis added).
3

Prosecutors may file petitions in the juvenile court under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6103(l)(a), which provides, in relevant part:
(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, the juvenile court has exclusive
original jurisdiction in proceedings concerning:
(a) a child who has violated any federal, state, or local law or municipal
ordinance or a person younger than 21 years of age who has violated any law
or ordinance before becoming 18 years of age, regardless of where the
violation occurred, excluding offenses in Subsection 78A-7-106(2)[.]
Section 78A-7-106(2) pertains to traffic and other misdemeanors in the jurisdiction of the
justice of the peace courts.
The Court explained the problem with the direct file statute in Mohi which remains in the
current statutory scheme:
[T]he present Act treats a certain subclass of juveniles nonuniformly. Juveniles
against whom indictments or informations are filed are statutorily
indistinguishable from those who remain in juvenile jurisdiction. By the very
terms of the statute, they are accused of the same offenses and fall into the
same age ranges. There is absolutely nothing in the statute to identify the
juveniles to be tried as adults; it describes no distinctive characteristics to set
them apart from juveniles in the other statutory class who remain in juvenile
jurisdiction. However, there are critically important differences in the
treatment of those juveniles tried as adults compared to those left in the
juvenile system.

2

701. The present direct file statute significantly augments the prosecutors' unconstitutional
discretion from that in effect at the time of Mohi by removing all judicial review of the
prosecutor's choice to file in adult court 5
The State argues that the direct file statute grants prosecutors only standard
prosecutorial discretion to select a charge, and that district courts may "remedy" a
prosecutor's overcharging an offense to bring a child into adult court by virtue of Utah Code
Ann. §§ 78A-6-601 and 78A-6-701(3)(b). State's brief at 33. Section 78A-6-601 provides:
(1) If, during the pendency of a criminal or quasi-criminal proceeding in
another court, including a preliminary hearing, it is determined that the person
charged is under 21 years of age and was less than 18 years of age at the time
of committing the alleged offense, that court shall transfer the case to the
juvenile court, together with all the papers, documents, and transcripts of any
testimony except as provided in Sections 78A-6-702 and 78A-6--703.
(2) The court making the transfer shall order the person to be taken
immediately to the juvenile court or to a place of detention designated by the
juvenile court, or shall release him to the custody of his parent or guardian or
other person legally responsible for him, to be brought before the juvenile
court at a time designated by it. The juvenile court shall then proceed as
provided in this chapter.

Mohi. 901 P.2d at 998.
5

Unlike the former statute, the present direct file statute contains no recall provision.
See. In re N.H.B.. 777 P.2d 487, 490-92 (Utah App. 1989) (upholding direct filing statute
because, inter alia^ the recall hearings provided the right to counsel, a record of the
proceedings, a hearing, and appropriate findings); State v. Bell 785 P.2d 390, 402-404 (Utah
1989) (in upholding direct filing statute, which was contingent on the juvenile court's
determination that recall to juvenile court was inappropriate, the court recognized, "[0]ur
decision is supported by the crucial fact that under the statute in question, the juvenile court
has the right and retains the power in the final regard to 'recall control' over the child and
bring him or her back into the juvenile system.").
Nor does the current direct file statute contemplate an appeal of right from the child's
arrival in the adult system, which appeals are provided as a matter of right for children whose
cases arrive in adult court through certification from the juvenile court or through a Serious
Youth Offender bindover order from juvenile court. See Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-704.

3

This statute recognizes that direct file children are not properly prosecuted in adult court,
and should have their cases transferred to juvenile court as soon as an adult court determines
that they are under 21 at the time of the hearing and were under 18 at the time of the alleged
offense. It does not stand for the proposition that a district court should assess the evidence
and determine whether the charge selected by a prosecutor was excessive.6
The other statute which the State holds out as a remedy to overcharging by
prosecutors, 78A-6-701(3)(b), provides:

(b) If the qualifying charge under Subsection (1) results in an acquittal,
a finding of not guilty, or a dismissal of the charge in the district court, the

6

The State's reliance on §78A-6-601 as a remedy for prosecutorial overcharging of
offenses appears to conflict with its later argument regarding 78A-6-601, which follows:
Defendant identifies a new conflict for the first time on appeal. He
contends that the direct-file statute cannot be reconciled with section 78A-6601, which requires that district court judges transfer juvenile cases back to
the juvenile courts unless they arrive in district court by means of SYO or
certification statutes. See Br. of Aplt. at 45. Defendant's argument ignores the
fact that the direct file statute represents a grant of "exclusive original
jurisdiction" of direct file matters to the district court, thereby leaving no
conflict. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701(l).
Section 78A-6-601 applies only to those matters over which juvenile
court may exercise some jurisdiction, as demonstrated by its express exclusion
from its terms of only those matters which at some level involve juvenile
court jurisdiction See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-601(l). Direct-file matters,
however, have been expressly excepted from juvenile court jurisdiction, and,
hence, need not be excepted from section 78A-6-601 in order to remain in the
district court.
Id- at 43-44 (footnote quoting 78A-6-601(l) omitted). The State's argument in this latter
regard does not square with the plain language of the direct file statute, which only requires
children's cases to be filed in adult court if they are charged by indictment or information.
See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701. Nor does it square with the statutes indicating that such
cases are to be prosecuted in juvenile court. See Utah Code Ann. § §78A-6-103(l)(a), 78A-6116, and 78A-6-601., supra.

4

juvenile court under Section 78A-6-103 and the Division of Juvenile Justice
Services regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the
minor.
In assessing the State's argument, it is important to note that subsection (2) of 78A-6-701
provides continuing jurisdiction in adult court as long as the child is convicted of a joined or
lesser offense.7 Thus, a child would remain in the adult system even if the murder or
aggravated murder charge were wholly unsupported, provided that there were another charge
in the information or indictment, and/or that there were a lesser offense to a murder charge

7

78A-6-701 provides:

(1) The district court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all
persons 16 years of age or older charged by information or indictment with:
(a) an offense which would be murder or aggravated
murder if committed by an adult; or
(b) an offense which would be a felony if committed by
an adult if the minor has been previously committed to a secure
facility as defined in Section 62A-7-101. This Subsection (l)(b)
shall not apply if the offense is committed in a secure facility.
(2) When the district court has exclusive original jurisdiction over a
minor under this section, it also has exclusive original jurisdiction over the
minor regarding all offenses joined with the qualifying offense, and any other
offenses, including misdemeanors, arising from the same criminal episode. The
district court is not divested of jurisdiction by virtue of the fact that the minor
is allowed to enter a plea to, or is found guilty of, a lesser or joined offense.
(3) (a) Any felony, misdemeanor, or infraction committed after the
offense over which the district court takes jurisdiction under Subsection (1) or
(2) shall be tried against the defendant as an adult in the district court or justice
court having jurisdiction.
(b) If the qualifying charge under Subsection (1) results
in an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or a dismissal of the
charge in the district court, the juvenile court under Section
78A-6-103 and the Division of Juvenile Justice Services regain
jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the
minor.
5

to keep the child in adult court. See id. District court judges faced with motions to dismiss
generally recognize that murder and lesser included offenses turn on the defendant's intent
and other factual issues that are normally the jury's to decide. See, e.g.. Sandstrom v.
Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523 (1979) (explaining jury role to assess facts and intent). Also, the
State's argument does not account for the reality that many children will plead out in adult
court prior to trial rather than risk facing the full consequences which are attendant to
prosecution for murder or aggravated murder in adult court.
Assuming arguendo that a district court judge would dismiss a murder charge based
on a lack of evidence, and not allow the case to proceed on a lesser or joined offense, this
would not entirely remedy the harms a juvenile might experience while in the adult system,
such as being held in the Salt Lake County adult jail illegally for over a year, see, e^g., Angilau
v. Winder, 20090677.
N o r would this be a true remedy for the type of prosecutorial discretion permitted by
the statute. As the Mohi Court explained in distinguishing between the legitimate type of
prosecutorial discretion and that afforded by the direct file statute:
The type of discretion incorporated in the Act is unlike traditional
prosecutor discretion. Selecting a charge to fit the circumstances of a
defendant and his or her alleged acts is a necessary step in the chain of any
prosecution. It requires a legal determination on the part of the prosecutor as
to which elements of an offense can likely be proved at trial. Moreover, such
discretion is also beneficial to the public; it allows prosecutors to plea-bargain
with offenders in some cases, saving the public the expense of criminal
prosecutions. However, none of these benefits accompany the discretion to
choose which juveniles to prosecute in adult rather than in juvenile court. The
elements of the offense are determined by the charging decision, and it is only
the charging decision that is protected by traditional notions of prosecutor

6

discretion. Choosing which court to file charges in has significant
consequences for the offender, and the statute does not indicate what
characteristics of the offender mandate that choice. The scope for prosecutor
stereotypes, prejudices, and biases of all kinds is simply too great. If it is the
legislature's determination to have all members of a certain group of violent
juveniles (such as repeat offenders, those who use guns, etc.) tried as adults, it
is free to do so. However, the legislature may not create a scheme which
permits the random and unsupervised separation of all such violent juveniles
into a relatively privileged group on the one hand and a relatively burdened
group on the other.

Id. at 1002-03 (citations omitted).

The State argues that Angilau does not claim an abuse of charging discretion by the
prosecutor. State's brief at 32-33. Angilau has not yet had a preliminary hearing, let alone a
trial, and thus has no record from which to argue that the murder charge is excessive in this
case. 8 Contrary to the State's position, Angilau has consistently contended that the
prosecutor's choice to file his case in adult court was erroneously based on her misperception
that he is a gang participant (e.g. R. 85, 236-37;
http://www.ksLcom/?sid=5424474&autostart=y&nid= : 148.).
The District Attorney's choice to file Angilau's case in adult court was ostensibly not
the result of any belief that she had no authority to file the case in juvenile court. See id.
Rather, and as the State has never contested, the choice was premised in significant part on
her erroneous perception that Angilau is a gang member.

Compare Angilau's opening brief

The State's brief states the facts as if it were established that Angilau committed the
offenses charged. See State's brief at 3. As is true of Angilau's opening brief, the State's
brief relies solely on the probable cause statement in alleging the facts, as there has been no
preliminary hearing or trial. See State's brief at 3.

7

at 4-5 with State's brief,passim? This case thus presents a stark object lesson on why one
person, politically elected or not, should not have unguided and unchecked power to
determine whether a child is prosecuted in adult or juvenile court.
Regardless of the legitimacy of the motivation for charging Angilau as an adult, and
regardless of the fact that the legislative goal of addressing violent crimes by juveniles is
meritorious, the unconstitutional nature of the statute is determinative. As the Court
explained in rejecting similar arguments in Mohi
The State argues that the direct-file provision of the Act is reasonably related
to the statute's stated purpose because there is a legitimate need to try certain
violent juveniles as adults. We agree with the State's assertion of need but
observe that the legislature has failed to specify which violent juveniles require
such treatment, instead delegating that discretion to prosecutors who have no
guidelines as to how it is to be exercised. Legitimacy of a goal cannot justify an
arbitrary means. The State asserts that this problem is cured by the fact that
prosecutors often have legitimate reasons for wanting to leave persons eligible
for adult prosecution in juvenile court. But the statute does not require the
prosecutor to have any reason, legitimate or otherwise, to support his or her
decision of who stays in juvenile jurisdiction and who does not. Legitimacy in
the purpose of the statute cannot make up for a deficiency in its design.
Id. 901 P.2d at 998.
Contrary to inferences which might be drawn from the "background" discussion in

9

Prior to his arrest and incarceration in the adult jail, Angilau was physically active in
sports, working hard at school, and participated regularly in family, scouting and church
activities (Kg,, R. 216-233, 545; T. 9/14/2009 at 5).
Counsel for Angilau sought evidence that Angilau is in a gang through subpoenas to
the Salt Lake City Police Department and the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Metro Gang Unit
on May 14, 2009 (R. 421-24), and through a discovery request to the prosecution on May
20, 2009 (R. 425-28). As of the September 14, 2009 hearing on the motion to release
Angilau from Pretrial Sendees, no such evidence had been produced (T. 9/14/2009 at 13).

8

the State's brief (at pages 9-11), it is not only fourteen and fifteen year old children who may
be certified to adult court in the event the Court strikes the direct file statute.10 Under
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-602(3), sixteen and seventeen year olds charged with murder are
also subject to certification; it is only the Serious Youth Offender juveniles who are excluded
from the certification process.11 In the event this Court strikes the direct file statute, children

10

The State's argument in this regard is directly supported by In re A.B.. 936 P.2d
1091, 1093 (Utah App. 1997). As is discussed herein, A.B, is incorrect in this respect
n

78A-6-602 provides, in full:
(1) A proceeding in a minor's case is commenced by petition.

(2) (a) A peace officer or any public official of the state, any county,
city, or town charged with the enforcement of the laws of the state or local
jurisdiction shall file a formal referral with the juvenile court within ten days
of a minor's arrest. If the arrested minor is taken to a detention facility, the
formal referral shall be filed with the juvenile court within 72 hours, excluding
weekends and holidays. There shall be no requirement to file a formal referral
with the juvenile court on an offense that would be a class B misdemeanor or
less if committed by an adult.
(b) When the court is informed by a peace officer or
other person that a minor is or appears to be within the court's
jurisdiction, the probation department shall make a preliminary
inquiry to determine whether the interests of the public or of
the minor require that further action be taken.
(c) Based on the preliminary inquiry, the court may
authorize the filing of or request that the county attorney or
district attorney as provided under Sections 17-18-1 and 17-1817 file a petition. In its discretion, the court may, through its
probation department, enter into a written consent agreement
with the minor and, if the minor is a child, the minor's parent,
guardian, or custodian for the nonjudicial adjustment of the
case if the facts are admitted and establish prima facie
jurisdiction. Efforts to effect a nonjudicial adjustment may not
extend for a period of more than 90 days without leave of a
judge of the court, who may extend the period for an additional

90 days.

9

(d) The nonjudicial adjustment of a case may include
conditions agreed upon as part of the nonjudicial closure:
(i) payment of a financial penalty of not
more than $250 to the Juvenile Court;
(ii) payment of victim restitution;
(iii) satisfactory completion of
compensatory service;
(iv) referral to an appropriate provider for
counseling or treatment;
(v) attendance at substance abuse
programs or counseling programs;
(vi) compliance with specified restrictions
on activities and associations; and
(vii) other reasonable actions that are in
the interest of the child or minor and the
community.
(e) Proceedings involving offenses under Section 78A-6606 are governed by that section regarding suspension of
driving privileges.
(f) A violation of Section 76-10-105 that is subject to the
jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court shall include a minimum fine
or penalty of $60 and participation in a court-approved tobacco
education program, which may include a participation fee.
(3) Except as provided in Section 78A-6-702, in the case of a minor 14
years of age or older, the county attorney, district attorney, or attorney general
may commence an action by filing a criminal information and a motion
requesting the juvenile court to waive its jurisdiction and certify the minor to
the district court.
(4) (a) In cases of violations of wildlife laws, boating laws, class B and
class C misdemeanors, other infractions or misdemeanors as designated by
general order of the Board of Juvenile Court Judges, and violations of Section
76-10-105 subject to the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court, a petition is not
required and the issuance of a citation as provided in Section "8^-6-603 is
sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. A preliminary inquiry is not
required unless requested by the court.
(b) Any failure to comply with the time deadline on a
10

subject to prosecution under the statute might still be certified to adult court in appropriate
cases wherein due process of law is afforded.

II.

THERE HAS BEEN N O SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN THE
RECOGNIZED PURPOSES OF OUR JUVENILE
COURTS.

The State repeatedly argues as if Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-102(5) were rewritten in
1996 to reflect a shift in the purpose of the juvenile courts away from the goal of
rehabilitation, by emphasizing public safety, individual accountability and appropriate
sanctions over rehabilitation, reeducation and treatment. State's brief at 34-35, 13, 21. 12 By
reviewing the legislative history, the Court may confirm that the current statute defining
purposes of our juvenile courts has not been significantly amended in that respect since it
was enacted in 1988.13 The statutory purposes of our juvenile courts have included a range

formal referral may not be the basis of dismissing the formal
referral.
12

The State's argument in this regard is directly supported by In re A.B.. 936 P.2d
1091, 1098 (Utah App. 1997). As is discussed herein, A.B. is incorrect in this respect.
13

The 1988 version of the statute, then found at 78-3a-l, provided:

The juvenile court is established as a forum for the resolution of all
matters properly brought before it, consistent with applicable constitutional
and statutory requirements of due process. The court has the jurisdiction,
powers, and duties under this chapter to:
(1) promote public safety and individual accountability by the
imposition of appropriate sanctions on persons who have committed acts in
violation of law;
(2) where appropriate, order rehabilitation, reeducation, and treatment
for persons who have committed acts bringing them within the court's
jurisdiction;
11

of factors accounting for the unique developmental needs of our children, and the need for
public safety for many years. 14 There is nothing in the language of the current or former
statutes intimating that the purposes served by the juvenile courts are listed in order of
importance, or indicating that the fundamental overarching purposes of the juvenile courts
have shifted away from rehabilitation of children in response to violent crimes by juveniles.
Our law continues to accurately reflect what the State does not contest: our juvenile
courts are designed to serve the public interest in meeting the special developmental needs of
children, whose brains and related abilities to think and behave well are physiologically not

(3) adjudicate matters that relate to abused, neglected, and dependent
children and to provide care and protection for these children by placement,
protection, and custody orders;
(4) adjudicate matters that relate to children who are beyond parental or
adult control and to establish appropriate authority over these children by
means of placement and control orders;
(5) order appropriate measures to promote guidance and control,
preferably in the child's own home, as an aid in the prevention of future
unlawful conduct and the development of responsible citizenship;
(6) remove a child from parental custody only where the minor's safety
or welfare, or the public safety, may not otherwise be adequately safeguarded;
and
(7) consistent with the ends of justice, strive to act in the best interests
of the children in all cases and attempt to preserve and strengthen family ties
where possible.
The 1965 precursor statute, 78-3a-l, indicated:
It is the purpose of this act to secure for each child coming before the
juvenile court such care, guidance and control, preferably in his own home, as will
serve his welfare and the best interests of the state; to preserve and strengthen family
ties whenever possible; to secure for any child who is removed from his home the
care, guidance , and discipline required to assist him to develop into a responsible
citizen, to improve the conditions and home environment responsible for his
delinquency; and at the same time, to protect the community and its individual
citizens against juvenile violence and juvenile lawbreaking. T o this end this
act shall be liberally construed.
12

fully developed when they are under the age of eighteen. Compare Angilau's opening brief
at 6-10 with State's briti passim.

III.

THE DECISION TO PROSECUTE A CHILD IN ADULT
COURT INVOLVES LIFE AND LIBERTY INTERESTS,
AND REQUIRES FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS OF DUE
PROCESS OF LAW.

The State argues that the legislature has full authority to require children to be
prosecuted directly in adult court without due process of law, and that it is only when
children begin in juvenile court and are transferred from juvenile court to adult court that
due process is required. State's brief at 14-17.
Assuming the State's argument to be correct, the direct file statute, 78A-6-701, is in
the Juvenile Court Act under the Part 7, which addresses "transfers of jurisdiction." The
juvenile court has original jurisdiction over such children and offenses by virtue of Utah
Code Ann. § §78A-6-103(l)(a),15 78A-6-116,16 and 78A-6-601.17 It is the prosecutor's

15

Prosecutors may file petitions in the juvenile court under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6103(l)(a), which provides, in relevant part:
(1) Except as otherwise provided by law, the juvenile court has exclusive
original jurisdiction in proceedings concerning:
(a) a child who has violated any federal, state, or local law or municipal
ordinance or a person younger than 21 years of age who has violated any law
or ordinance before becoming 18 years of age, regardless of where the
violation occurred, excluding offenses in Subsection 78A-7-106(2)[.]
Section 78A-7-106(2) pertains to traffic and other misdemeanors in the jurisdiction of the
justice of the peace courts.
16

This statute provides in relevant part:
(1) Except as provided in Sections 78A-6-702 [the Serious Youth Offender
13

choice to file an information or indictment rather than a petition, and not the choice of the
legislature, which determines whether children are prosecuted in juvenile court or in adult
court in direct file cases such as Angilau's, and transfers them into the adult system.
Compare Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-701(l)(a)18 with § 78A-6-103(l)(a), supra.

Statute] and 78A-6-703 [the certification statute], proceedings in a minorfs case
shall be regarded as a civil proceeding with the court exercising equitable
powers.
(3) A minor may not be charged with a crime or convicted in any court except
as provided in Sections 78A-6-702 [the Serious Youth Offender statute] and
78A-6-703 [the certification statute], and in cases involving traffic violations.
When a petition has been filed in the juvenile court, the minor may not later
be subjected to criminal prosecution based on the same facts except as
provided in Section 78A-6-702 or 78A-6-703.
17

This statute provides:
(1) If, during the pendency of a criminal or quasi-criminal proceeding in
another court, including a preliminary hearing, it is determined that the person
charged is under 21 years of age and was less than 18 years of age at the time
of committing the alleged offense, that court shall transfer the case to the
juvenile court, together with all the papers, documents, and transcripts of any
testimony except as provided in Sections 78A-6-702 [the Serious Youth
Offender statute] and 78A-6-703 [the Certification statute].
(2) The court making the transfer shall order the person to be taken
immediately to the juvenile court or to a place of detention designated by the
juvenile court, or shall release him to the custody of his parent or guardian or
other person legally responsible for him, to be brought before the juvenile
court at a time designated by it. The juvenile court shall then proceed as
provided in this chapter.
18

The direct file statute only requires adult prosecutions if prosecutors opt to file
charges by information or indictment, rather than petitions. It provides in relevant part:
(1) The district court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all
persons 16 years of age or older charged by information or indictment with:
(a) an offense which would be murder or
aggravated murder if committed by an adultf.]
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Assuming that there is no transfer involved in direct file cases, the authorities upon
which Angilau relies in seeking due process in the decision to prosecute him in adult court do
not afford due process solely in the context of transfers from juvenile court, as the State
contends. See State's brief at 14-16. Mohi cites State in re Clatterbuck 700 P.2d 1076, 1078
(Utah 1985); and Kent v. United States. 383 U.S. 541, 553 (1966), in recognizing that due
process is required when the critical interest of a juvenile's trial forum is at stake. Mohi. 901
P.2d at 995-96. Mohi was a direct file case, wherein Mohi began in the adult system, and
which thus involved no formalized "transfer" from juvenile court to adult court, as the State
uses the term transfer. See id., 901 P.2d at 994. The Court nonetheless recognized the
critical nature of the forum selection in discussing how due process must be afforded. See
id. at 994-95. In re N.H.B.. 777 P.2d 487 (Utah App. 1989), was also a direct file case,
wherein the court of appeals upheld the statutory scheme because the recall provision in
effect at that time (but since repealed) provided the procedural protections required by Kent.
See N.H.B.. 777 P.2d at 490-91. In re R.D.S.. 777 P.2d 532 (Utah App. 1989), is also a direct
file case wherein the court upheld the recall provision on the basis of N.H.B.'s holding. See
id, 777 P.2d at 534. Thus, due process is required in direct file cases such as Angilau's
regardless of whether there is a formal or recognized "transfer" of jurisdiction from juvenile
to adult court.
The State suggests that case law relied on by Angilau uniformly rejects the notion that
there is a liberty interest at stake in the selection between juvenile and adult fora. State's brief
at 16-17. The Kent Court's conclusion that due process was required hinged significantly on
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the fact that the decision as to which forum the child would be prosecuted in made a
difference between his potential incarceration in the juvenile system for five years and his
potential execution in the adult system. Id., 383 U.S. at 557. Thus, Kent is fairly read as
recognizing that both life and liberty interests may well be at stake in the choice between
juvenile and adulter* of prosecution. Kent is fairly read as demonstrating that presence or
absence of life and liberty interests is fairly assessed by considering the ultimate potential
outcomes in adult and juvenile courts. See id. Similarly, in Mohi, 901 P.2d 991 (Utah 1995),
this Court considered the disparate sentencing consequences attendant to adult and juvenile
prosecutions, and found that Mohi had a "'critically important' liberty interest in the
sentencing phase of his prosecution". Id. at 1003 and n.18 (quoting Clatterbuck 700 P.2d at
1076,1079 (Utah 1985). But see State's brief at 16 (claiming that the Court rejected "Mohi's
claim of a liberty interest under the direct-file statute.").19
Because there are both life and liberty interests at stake in the determination of
whether a child is prosecuted in adult or juvenile court, e.g.. Mohi and Kent, procedural due
process must be afforded under Article I § 7 of the Utah Constitution. See e.g.. Christiansen
v. Harris. 163 P.2d 314, 317 (Utah 1945). But see State's brief at 19.
While the State expresses dissatisfaction with the state constitutional analysis
proffered in Angilau's brief, State's brief at 18-22, there are situations in which it is entirely
19

The State's reliance on State v. Bell 784 P.2d 390, 399 (Utah 1989), is curious, given
the Mohi Court's recognition that the portion of Bell upon which the State relies is a nonbinding plurality decision, and given that the Mohi Court effectively supplanted that portion
of Bell with more protective state constitutional law. See Mohi. 901 P.2d at 996 n.3. State in
re Atcheson. 575 P.2d 181 (Utah 1978), does not address liberty interests, but see State's
brief at 17, but does intimate that children may be prosecuted in adult court anytime.
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appropriate to simply acknowledge and enforce our state constitutional provisions. See, e.g..
State v. DeMille. 756 P.2d 81, 84 (Utah 1988) (holding on the basis of very brief briefing by
the State that state constitution prohibited inquiry into juror's responses to prayers in posttrial inquiry because Utah Constitution protects the religious liberties of jurors). Counsel for
Angilau are seeking a ruling from this Court which is consistent with the Utah and Federal
Constitutions and the remainder of the Utah Code. Accordingly, it is appropriate to inform
the Court on the provisions of law which collectively support a ruling striking the direct file
statute. C £ , e ^ I.M.L. v. State. 2002 U T 110, Tf26, 61 P.3d 1038 (noting basic rules of
statutory construction requiring courts to interpret related laws in harmonious fashion).
The State's analysis under the state constitution is wanting because the State fails to
acknowledge that the direct file statute classifies between those children who will be
prosecuted by indictment or information in adult court and those who will be adjudicated by
petition in juvenile court, without providing any rationale or statutory criteria for a
prosecutor to follow in making the choice. See State's brief at 27-40. The State's tacit
acknowledgment that any legitimate public interest to be served by the direct file statute is
already and equally served by the certification statute, State's brief at 37-38, confirms that the
direct file statute is not necessary to serve any legitimate purpose.
The State does not mention by name Kclley v. Kaiser, 992 F.2d 1509 (10 th O r . 1993),
which recogni2es that once a state creates a juvenile court system, the federal constitution
requires a Kent hearing as a constitutional requirement of any adult court prosecution. Id. at
1515. State's brief passim. The State refers to the opinion obliquely, as if this Court in Mohi

17

were utilizing that opinion solely to warn the legislature against constitutional problems
which might arise if the legislature attempted to try all children as adults without judicial
review. State's brief at 18 n.2. Mohi repeatedly draws attention to Kaiser, first citing it to
question the State's proposition that no direct file statute had been held unconstitutional.
Mohi. 901 P.2d at 1001 n.14. Mohi does cite Kelley in noting the constitutional concerns
which would arise if the legislature sought adult treatment of all juveniles without a hearing,
but also quotes the key language in Kaiser, which the State does not refute: "'Having created
the juvenile court system, under Kent, it is the State's decision to seek to treat a juvenile as an
adult that, in and of itself triggers the need for a hearing."' Mohi, 901 P.2d at 1003 n.19,
quoting Kaiser at 1515. The Court harkened back to note 19 and Kaiser in a footnote to the
sentence in Mohi indicating that juveniles would have no state due process right to a hearing
if they had been charged properly as adults, intimating that the Court recognized that the
proposition as to the lack of a right to a hearing was open to question. See Mohi. 901 P.2d at
1005 n.24.
Angilau has presented both state and federal constitutional precedent which the Court
should consider and upon which the Court should rely in reiterating and giving effect to the
rationale of Mohi and Kent:
"[Tjhere is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such
tremendous consequences [prosecuting children in the adult system] without
ceremony-without a hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a
statement of reason. It is inconceivable that a court of justice dealing with
adults would proceed in this manner. It would be extraordinary if society's
special concern for children ... permitted this procedure. "
State v. Mohi. 901 P.2d 991, 996 n.2., quoting Kent, 383 U.S. at 554.
18

IV.

THE STATE'S EFFORTS TO UPHOLD THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING
ARE INCORRECT.

The State's efforts to uphold the trial court's ruling fail to acknowledge that the direct
file statute does not require prosecutors to file informations in district court, but permits
them to file petitions in juvenile court. See State's brief at 41 n.8, relying on State's brief at
33-38. While portions of the floor debates do indicate Senator Hillyard's belief that the
legislation would eliminate the prosecutorial discretion which concerned the Court in Mohi.
the floor debates occurred before Mohi was published, and the legislature did not have the
benefit of the Mohi decision when the direct file statute was amended. The Court normally
does not rely on floor debates when statutory language is clear, as it is here. See, e ^ , Vigos
v. Mountainland Builders Inc.. 2000 UT 2, f 13, 993 P.2d 207.20
The State argues that the trial court did not err in refusing to analyze Angilau's
constitutional challenges to the direct file statute, because controlling precedents
demonstrated that as long as the statute did not provide excessive prosecutorial discretion,
the statute was constitutional. State's brief at 41 n.8. The statute did and still does provide
excessive prosecutorial discretion, and the state and federal constitutional law relied on by
Angilau in the trial court provided legitimate authority for the trial court to consider in
fulfilling its duty to uphold the state and federal constitutions (R. 28-56, 78-405, and R.
A/6/20W, passim). See, e.g.. Attorney's Oath in the Preamble to the Rules of Professional

20

The floor debates underlying SB 111 are appended to this brief. It remains
Angilau's position that the plain language of the statutes involved is abundantly clear.
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Conduct.
The State does not defend the trial court's literal rewriting of 78A-6-116. Compare
Angilau's opening brief at 44-46 (discussing the impropriety of a court's inferring substantive
terms into a statute) with State's brief (describing this aspect of the trial court's ruling as
"trying to explain" the statute). The State's argument that section 78A-6-116 refers only to
matters wherein juvenile courts exercise jurisdiction, like the trial court's ruling to the same
effect, is incorrect. Subsection (3) of the statute provides:
(3) A minor may not be charged with a crime or convicted in any court except
as provided in Sections 78A-6-702 and 78A-6-703, and in cases involving
traffic violations. When a petition has been filed in the juvenile court, the
minor may not later be subjected to criminal prosecution based on the same
facts except as provided in Section 78A-6-702 or 78A-6-703.
Many traffic offenses are actually excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction, and instead often
lie in the original jurisdiction of the justice of the peace courts, or in district courts when
there are no justice courts in the municipality where the case arises, if the defendants are
sixteen years of age or older.22 Thus, 78A-6-116 is not properly read or rewritten as if it
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A11 members of the Utah State Bar, including the trial court, are bound by the
attorney's oath:
I do solemnly swear that I will support, obey and defend the Constitution of the
United States and the Constitution of Utah; that I will discharge the duties of
attorney and counselor at law as an officer of the courts of this State with honesty,
fidelity, professionalism, and civility; and that I will faithfully observe the Rules of
Professional Conduct and the Standards of Professionalism and Civility promulgated
by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah.
22

The State's representation that juvenile courts share jurisdiction with other courts
over those traffic offenses over which the juvenile courts have exclusive jurisdiction, State's
brief at 43, is incorrect. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-7-106 (2) (recognizing justice court
jurisdiction over many traffic and other misdemeanors committed by those sixteen years of
age and older); 78A-6-103(l)(a) (excluding cases falling within 78A-7-106(2) from juvenile
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applied only to cases wherein the juvenile courts have jurisdiction. Rather, it is properly read
according to its plain language, in reflecting that aside from cases involving certification and
Serious Youth Offender charges, proceedings involving children are civil and fall within the
juvenile court's equitable powers. 78A-6-116(l). 78A-6-116(3) is properly given its literal
interpretation: a minor may not be charged with or convicted of a crime in any court except
in certification, Serious Youth Offender, and traffic cases. See id.
In sum, the direct file statute is unconstitutional and does not comport with the
remainder of the Utah Code.

CONCLUSION
This Court should strike the direct file statute on constitutional grounds and reverse
the trial court's order denying the motion to dismiss the information and case from adult
court.

court jurisdiction), 78A-5-102(9) (recognizing district court jurisdiction over many traffic,
offenses committed by those sixteen or older in jurisdictions without justice courts).
21

Respectfully submitted this 2 ^ day of February, 2010,.
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ADDENDUM
FLOOR DEBATES ON SBl 11

SENATE BILL 111
SERIOUS YOUTH OFFENDER

SENATE DEBATE
51ST LEGISLATURE
GENERAL SESSION
DAY 25 — FEBRUARY 9, 1995
TAPE 20 AT 752
Secretary:

Senate Bill 111, Serious Youth Offender, by
Senator Hillyard and the Committee Report
February 6, 1995: "Mr. President, the Human
Services Committee reports a favorable
recommendation on Senate Bill 111 with
amendments on pages 7, 8, 9, 1 3 , and 13 .
Respectfully, Charles Stewart, Acting
Committee Chair."
Move we adopt the Committee Report.

Mr. President:

Motion to adopt the Committee Report.
those in favor say "aye."

Body:

Aye.

Mr. President:

Are there any opposed?

All

Body:

(None)

Mr. President:

Seeing no opposition, the bill is before us,
Senate Bill 111. Senator Hillyard.

Sen. Hillyard:

Thank you, Mr. President. I want to direct
the Senate's attention to the fact that this
is probably going to be one of the most
important pieces of legislation that we
consider this session as it relates to crime,
and it's a part of a package. It's not the
sole crime package, but it's part of it.
The body may also remember a year ago, I
filed the bill under the same name, quite a
bit different from this bill. It was Senate
Bill 249. We had a very interesting debate
in which I had opposition from a number of
people in law enforcement because I felt that
it was doing the proper thing to give more
power to the juvenile court judges to address
the serious problems of gang and youth
violence.

This body chose to adopt and pass that bill
unanimously. We realized in passing it, it
carried a significant fiscal note, but we
also knew that it would be giving a message
that we wanted something done in this area.
And I can report back-- since that action in
the past year, there has been a tremendous
amount of work by all the various agencies to
have come together to bring to you Senate
Bill 111, which is a serious youth offender
bill.
This bill is being supported by a number of
people including the Governor, the Commission
on Criminal and Juvenile Justice, Utah
Sentencing Commission, Utah Substance Abuse
and Anti-violence Council, Utah Judicial
Council, juvenile court judges (and I should
indicate that the juvenile court judges have
felt left out in the process, now feel very
much a part of this process in coming to
grips with this), Board of Youth Corrections,
Utah Law Enforcement Legislative Committee,
and many, many others.
Let me just indicate that the bill does three
things. Number oner> it provides that if a
youth 16 or 17 years old is charged with
aggravated murder or murder, which was
formerly called first or second degree
murder, if they're charged with this, they
will be automatically transferred and treated
in the adult system.
One of the issues now pending before the Utah
Supreme Court involves a young man here in
Salt Lake City who shot and killed another
person, I think at the Triad Center. The
case up on appeal is whether our current
system is legal, where you can be certified
or directly filed at the discretion of the
prosecutor. The issue is whether, how much
discretion the prosecutor can have. And this
bill takes away from that, and if the
prosecutor chooses to charge as first or
second degree murder, aggravated or murder,
the young man or young woman is automatically
treated in the adult system.
The second place where it automatically goes
is if that youth has been committed to a
secure facility. They use the term committed
2

in juvenile court. We would t a l k about
confinement in a j a i l . But t h e committed,
and then commits a felony, which i s another
serious offense, then they automatically are
placed in the adult system. The reason being
i s the feeling is that if you have been
committed in the juvenile court system, that
i s the most severe punishment they can give
to you. And if that hasn't worked, the
feeling i s that you now completed the, what
i s available in the juvenile court system,
and you w i l l now, as the sayxng goes, i f you
commit an adult crime, y o u ' l l spend adult
time.
The t h i r d issue this case c r e a t e s , and a
thing t h a t I really like about i t , i s t h a t i t
l i s t s a number of very serious aggravated
offenses such as aggravated a r s o n , aggravated
a s s a u l t , aggravated kidnapping, e t c . If that
i s committed by a youth 16 o r 17 years of
age, then t h e r e ' s a process s e t up whereby he
i s c e r t i f i e d over to d i s t r i c t court but can
be retained by the juvenile c o u r t . So the
juvenile court will have a chance to hear
that in a preliminary hearing type s i t u a t i o n
and be able t o make-a decision t h a t , no,
there are programs for t h i s youth t h a t would •
s t i l l make him amenable to wliat can be done
in juvenile court and he would be r e t a i n e d .
I t does away with the direct f i l i n g so the
court, the prosecutor will n o t be able t o
d i r e c t l y f i l e any more, but w i l l go through a
preliminary hearing process i n front of the
juvenile court for those youth under the age
of 16. At our committee hearing, we had an
argument by the ACLU that t h i s v i o l a t e d
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l rights. I'm reminded of a
statement my good friend Senator Chic Bullen
said, i f you get four lawyer's together
arguing what is due process, y o u ' l l get six
different opinions. But I can assure you
that t h i s b i l l has been examined very
carefully by lawyers on t h a t issue of due
process and feel satisfied t h a t i t does
s a t i s f y the due process requirement.
Another question came up in committee whether
we ought to lower that age from 16 t o 15.
The 16 age was taken because there are a
number of factors that occur at 16, but also
3

in looking at the implementation of this
bill, the current data would show that, there
are probably going to be between 50 and 75
youth that will be impacted by that that have
just been in place. To lower that age, we
may come back and want to do that. But this
time, as we move forward, we think the
appropriate age is 16 and that's the line
that we want to draw.
Again, the message, we hope, and it's a
tragic part of our society, that there's
going to be youth who are going to end up in
the state prison because of their actions.
But the feeling is that there is mechanisms
within the adult system that if they really
don't warrant going to state prison, they can
be protected; but, on the other hand, many of
these youths or most of these youths will end
up in prison anyway, and we may as well get
them down there and protect society during
that time period.
This bill has been included in the Governor's
budget for funding, has a fiscal note
obviously with it. But as I've indicated to
the committee and I'.11 indicate to you, it's
only a part of the Governor's program. The
other very important part is to address the
things that we need to do in prevention.
Some of the programs in public education the
Governor's already led into to do and that
we've done, I think, will impact what we're
doing. Also, I think this gives a signal
that will be helpful in the areas of
prevention. And the other part of the parcel
will be, sadly enough, construction of more
prison space or making available. Some of
these youths, quite frankly, are a severe
danger not only to themselves but to society
and should be removed from the streets.
Mr. President, that is a synopsis of Senate
Bill ill. Again, has wide and broad base
support. I think it is an important step for
this Legislature to take.
Mr. President:

Thank you.

Senator Hull.

Sen, Hull:

Thank you. I was in the committee when this
was heard, and I do have some concern. I am
supportive of this bill. My concern is the
age at which they can be certified for the
4

district court, which is 16.
discussed.

And it's been

Sen. Hillyard:

They can certify below the ag-e of 16.

Sen- Hull:

That is correct.

Sen. Hillyard:

It's automatic at 16.

Sen. Hull:

It is automatic at 16. And my concern, and
I've asked this question on several of the
bills that have come up dealing with juvenile
justice, why they selected 15, and it's kind
of a random age, and I've received several
answers. One that, I guess the best answer
was that's the age yoti get a license so
you're more accountable. But there will be
other bills coming through, and I think I
will make, try to make an amendment to make
that lower, and another one dealing with
confidentiality. But I'm wondering, really
in our society where these kids are in
schools, it's drilled into their minds that
at age Ninth Grade that, as Least as far as
their academic behaviors are concerned, those
go in to stone, those credits and all their
behaviors and that are kept on school records
for public use for the rest of their lives,
from Ninth Grade on. And I'm wondering, if
we ought to not, since that ±s already
embedded in their minds that they should be
accountable then, the colleges use the Ninth,
Tenth and'Eleventh Grades for their
accountabilities, if not that is the age
where they ought to be taught in the courts
to be accountable, too. That's my only
concern. I am for, supportive of this bill
as is.

Sen. Hillyard:

I appreciate Senator Hull raising that issue.
And in response to it, in talking to Camille
Anthony, who is the director of CCDJ, her
comment was again, in checking back over,
they wanted to keep it at age 16 to see how
the thing works out. And if it turns out,
Senator Hull, I would be more than happy to
have you sponsor the bill to lower the age.

Mr. President:

Senator Howell.

Sen. Howell:

Thank you, Mr. President. Maybe we can just
make a little amendment here to do that
5

little friendly amendment, Camille.
would that be?

How

Sen. Hillyard:

To faint,
age.

Sen. Howell:

Senator Hillyard, as you know, I had the bill
with regards to concealed weapons and minors,
and that was one that I was very concerned
about because on a daily basis, we see, not
on a daily basis but quite often, we see
young people who are carrying concealed
weapons walking up and down Main Street and
so on and so forth. How would that, how
would your bill deal with those offenders?

Sen, Hillyard:

We clarify a conflict in the law currently.
There's a conflict in the law because
prosecutors can tell you that, they can
directly file on anyone directly in an adult
court.

Sen, Howell:

Right.

Sen. Hillyard:

That' s what they did in the case of the West
High student.

Sen. Howell:

Right.

Sen. Hillyard:

The juvenile court judges will tell you, in
reading the law, they can't do that and they
can bring them back. Now we resolve that
issue. They can no longer directly file.
What's going^tQ happen, if you're 16 or
older, one of these crimes, then you'll go
directly to an adult system. If you're under
age 16, you will then file in juvenile court
but request the juvenile court certify the
youth over. So you could have a 14 year old
who could be, in fact, certified over and
treated as an adult, but the juvenile court
would have a preliminary hearing to decide
whether that transfer ought to be made.

Sen. Howell:

So the juvenile justice then would make the
recommendation to bind them over as an adult?

Sen.

That's correct.

Hillyard:

Sen. Howell:

No.

I would resist changing the

Okay. Are we confident, and I guess this
gets back to the age factor, are we confident
that in those cases that they'll do it? Like
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when there' s a 14 year old who has been
involved in a felony, let's say? I mean, how
do I get warm fuzzies that they're going to
make this deci'sion about turning them over?
I mean, that's my concern, is that kid,
individual, who sees no future but they're
willing to shoot someone.
Sen. Hillyard:

Well, let me tell you the problem we had last
year and what got the opposition to my bill
was the frustration of juvenile court judges
that they would get a young man or young
woman and say, "You're going to spend eight
months in a secure facility," walk out of the
court, and youth correction would say, "We
don't have the room for you, you're out of
here." It was a joke. And so what we've
really done is now given the juvenile court
more play in what they're going to do.

Sen. Howell:

Okay. And that, that's the very situation is
to say, "We're filled up, sorry you've
committed this terrible heinous crime, but we
can't take any more." So I think that, if
what you're saying is now they have an
alternative to say, "You're certified as an
adult," or, a 16 year old, "You're out of
here." Great I

Sen. Hillyard:

And that's correct. And that's part of th£
package. I mean, to do this bill alone
without the prevention, without more bed
space, would be a mockery to the system and,
I think, a fraud on the people of the state
of Utah. We're doing all thrree of them.

Sen. Howell:

Mr. President, I withdrew my senate bill with
regards to juveniles and possession of guns
for this very reason. And tliis satisfies all
the requirements that I had in that bill, so
I commend Senator Hillyard for doing a great
job on this.

Mr, President;

Thank you, Senator Howell. Senator Hillyard.
Are there any further questions of Senator
Hillyard? Senator Hillyard, would you like
to sum up. Oh, excuse me, Senator
McAllister.

Sen. McAllister;

Senator Hillyard, I have a concern with
regard to the fiscal note that's on page 21.
And you show there the first full year costs,
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Now those figures, now if I understand
correctly, you expect that t h e r e would be 2
murders within t h a t f i r s t f u l l year, 15 f i r s t
degree, and so on, i s that c o r r e c t ?
Sen, Hillyard:

I ' d have t o , I ' d have to go t o Camille, who
has put t h i s i n .

Sen. McAllister:

Is that a proper assumption?

Sen. Hillyard:

Yes.

Sen. McAllister:

Well, the concern I have then, if you look 10
years from now, you're expecting 9 times more
murders, over 10, probably 12 times more
first degree, probably 3-1/2 times more
felonies, and so on. Do you really feel that
in 10 years, we're going to be living in an
environment, in a society where such crimes,
or is it just population? I'm really
overwhelmed with that kind of statistics.

Sen. Hillyard:

I understand. It's a cumulative buildup type
thing in the system. But, again, I can have
somebody address that fiscal note directly if
you want. But my understanding is, is that
the 18 reflects a buildup of over those time
periods.

Sen. McAllister:

I see then. It says 10th year, and there's
nothing to indicate accumulative on that.
Are you saying then that the fiscal note for
the first year would be $1,33 8,000, but
because we're dealing with a part of a year,
it's $351,800?

Sen. Hillyard:

That's correct.

Sen. McAllister:

But in the 10th year, we're not looking at
$8,000,000 in that year alone (but that's in
a sense what it says), but you're saying,
then if the first year is $1,338,000, it
ought to be something like 10 times that in
the 10th year, and it isn't.

Sen. Hillyard:

I would have to have Leo, who prepared the
fiscal note, as you know, he doesn't go just
directly on what somebody tells him, he put
some things together. I'd be glad to answer
it on the third reading.

Sen. McAllister:

I think that's fine, but I'd Ixke an answer
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on that, if you would, please , on the third.
Sen. Hillyard:

I'll get that information.

Mr. President:

Any further questions of Senator Hillyard?
Mr. President*

Sen. Hillyard:

Mr. President, before I sum u p , personal
privilege, I have an unrelated matter.

Mr. President, in summation, I think that
we've pointed out very well this is a bill
that's been worked on very hard by a number
of people. I am fortunate enough to be just
merely a spokesman to represent hundreds of
hours that have been put on this problem. We
realize this is not going to solve the
problem, it's a combination of other things
that need to be put together. But I think
it's an excellent beginning, and I would urge
the support of• this body, and I'd call for a
question on the bill.
Mr. President;

Thank you, Senator -Hillyard.
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Reading Clerk:

Senate Bill 111, Serious Youth Offender, by
Lyle W. Hillyard. Committee vote: 9 yes,
0 no, 3 absent.

Mr. Speaker:

Representative Fox.

Rep. Pox:

Yes, thank you, Mr. Speaker. Before I begin,
1 would like to move the amendments that have
been passed out under my name for Senate
Bill ill. Perhaps we ought to check and make
sure the body has those. Just been passed
out, just recently.
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Mr, Speaker:

Those who do not
Senate Bill 111,
see. The circle
circle and go on

have the amendments of
raise your hand so we can
does not, maybe we ought to
for a minute.

Rep. Pox:

That will be just fine while the
pages . . . .

Mr. Speaker:

I have a motion to circle Senate Bill 111.
Discussion that motion. Saying that, all in
favor say "aye."

Body:

Aye.

Mr. Speaker:

Opposed "no."

Body:

(None)

Mr. Speaker:

The motion carries. The bill is circled.
Madam Reading Clerk.

Rep. Fox:

Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I would move that we
uncircle Senate Bill 111.

Mr. Speaker:

We have a motion to,-remove the circle from
Senate Bill 111. Would you state the title.

Rep. Fox:

Yes, Serious Youth Offender.

Mr. Speaker:

Discussion of the motion to uncircle.

Seeing

none, all in favor say "aye."
Body:

Aye.

Mr. Speaker:

Opposed "no. "

Body:

(None)

Mr. Speaker:

The motion carries. The bill is, uncircled.
You may proceed.
Yes, thank you. I think everyone now has the
amendments that were just passed out, I
would like to move those amendments on page
19, line 21 and after 1, delete "proceedings"
and insert " except as provided in section
78-3a-25 and 78-3a-25.1 proceedings" and page
19, line 29, after "violations" insert
"criminal proceedings under section 78-3a-25
and 78-3a-25.1 or to establish the
10

Rep. Fox:

jurisdiction of the court under section 783a-16(l).lf Now, what that does is currently
our code states that juvenile court evidence
may not be used any place else other than the
juvenile court. To effect the provisions of
SB111, Serious Youth Offender, we need to
exempt the crimes committed that would fall
under this bill. So we wanted to, we have to
make that exemption in the current code.
Mr. Speaker:

The motion is that we accept the pink sheet
amendment under Representative Fox's name
dated February 23, 1995 at 5:08 p.m.
Discussion of the motion to amend. Seeing
none, all those in favor of the motion to
amend say "aye."

Body:

Aye.

Mr. Speaker:

Opposed "no."

Body:

(None)

Mr. Speaker\

The motion carries,
You may proceed.

Rep. Fox:

Thank you, Mr. Speaker. Unfortunately, Utah
has seen a tremendous expansion of our young
people who are committing serious crimes -murder, all sorts of drive-by shootings. ..We
see all these things happening. Frankly,
we're at a loss to how to deal with these
young criminals. They are still under age,
but they are hardened criminals nonetheless.

The bill is amended.

The serious youth offender bill is the
product of a year-long effort from Utah's
criminal and juvenile justice professionals
to create a new category of crime that will
safeguard the public and hold violent and
chronic juvenile offenders accountable. What
it does is it makes it so the district court
has exclusive original jurisdiction over
juveniles age 16 and older charged with
aggravated murder, murder and any felony
committed subsequent to confinement in the
most secure youth offender facilities.
Juveniles age 16 years and older who commit
one of the other ten serious offenses against
a person will be charged with adult crimes.
The preliminary hearing is held in the
juvenile court. If the juvenile court judge
11

finds probable cause, the burden will shift
to the defendant to show that he or she
should remain in the juvenile court. And
unless the defendant fits some stringent
criteria, he or she will go directly to trial
as an adult in the district court. Juveniles
who do not meet the serious youth offender
criteria may still be tried as adults in
district court under the current
certification process. For consistency,
those cases will also have preliminary
hearings in the juvenile court. I am glad to
answer questions.
Mr. Speaker:

Representative Bresnahan.

Rep. Bresnahan:

Thank you, Mr. Speaker. Will the sponsor
yield?

Rep. Fox:

Yes.

Rep. Bresnahan:

I have a question regarding the section
beginning on page 6 and 7 regarding a felony
committ-ed by a juvenile age 1.4 or older. And
if you wouldn't mind, I'd like to understand
the difference between what was said earlier
in the bill about 16 and older and this
section regarding 14 and older.

Rep. Fox:

Under current law, the burden of proof is on
the State to show why they shouldn't. This
new change, it would shift that burden to the
defendant to prove why they should be judged
as a juvenile.

Rep. Bresnahan:

So, this--

Rep. Fox:

As an adult, I'm sorry.

Rep• Bresnahan:

This makes it easier for us to certify some
of these offenders as adults? Is that my
understanding? Is that correct?

Rep - Fox:

Yes.

Rep. Bresnahan:

That's the only question I have. I'd like to
say that I do support this bill very
heartily. It is needed. I have been, I've
taken the time to tour our juvenile
facilities. I've gone through every step of
the way that a juvenile could go through
those facilities at all the different levels.
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And I've had opportunity not only to
interview the staff at those facilities but
many of the juveniles involved there as well
as some of their parents. It is quite clear
to me that we are dealing with a large
portion of the juvenile population who are
not only violent offenders but they are
repeat violent offenders.
And after having an opportunity to first-hand
see them and to gain some understanding of
their circumstances and the various things
that are happening in their lives, I think
the greatest service that we can do for .them
is to intercede as early as possible in the
chain of events that lead them down a lifelong road of violence and constantly
requiring incarceration by our society.
Hopefully, by taking action early, by being
strong early and getting tough early, we're
going to prevent the continual repeat
offenses that seem to take place over and
over again, where we're hearing stories
almost daily of youths that have been through
this system time, and time again, go back out
into society, and continue to cause greater
harm and greater injury to others, create
more crime. And not only do they do get
involved in it, but they're bringing others
along with them. I believe that the only-way
that we're going to be able to see a decrease
is to get tougher, particularly on the youth
offenders, and I think this is an excellent,
excellent bill and it's worthy of all our
support. Thank you.
Mr. Speaker:

Representative Barth.

Rep. Barth:

Thank you, Mr. Speaker. Let me start off by
saying this is a good bill. There's a lot of
thought and energy that have gone into this
bill. This bill is a couple of things,
though. It's not a cure-all. Anybody who
thinks that this bill is going to take all of
these serious youth offenders off the streets
and we're going to be rid of that problem is
mistaken, but it goes a long ways in doing
that. It's not the last step in fixing a
system that is antiquated that we need to
take, but it is a significant and important
step. This is going to take some kids off
the street and put them into the adult system
13

faster than if we don't pass this bill. This
bill will get them off the streets two years
earlier.
We're talking about 16 year olds that are
going to get to the adult system eventually.
They're continuing their behavior. They've
had their one shot at the juvenile system.
They're going to get into the adult system.
We need to be mindful of a couple things,
though. The kid needs a one-stop good shot
at the juvenile system and the resources that
are there.
Some people have said the average stay for a
juvenile in the juvenile facility is eight
months. That's true. But you're lumping in
there children that have been in there for
years, putting that into the average, take
the top 10% out and the bottom 10% out; the
average stay is about three months. That's a
beds problem. This addresses a different
problem, and we need to address that beds
problem as well, and we are in this
Legislature to some degree.
We're not throwing kids away after this. The
kids have had a one-shot at the juvenile
system, and we need to start getting tough
with them. We need to let them know that
their behavior is unacceptable, and they need
to change if they're going to be allowed out
in society. I would urge you to vote for
this bill heartily, but do it mindfully that
this is not the last step in fixing the
juvenile justice problem that we've got in
the state of Utah. This is not going to
decrease gangs sufficiently that we can stop,
rest on our laurels and quit. But it is a significant and worthwhile first step.
Mr. Speaker:

Representative M_

Rep. Johnson:

Thank you, Mr. Speaker
question, please.

Mr. Speaker:

Previous q u e s t i o n has been c a l l e d . A l l i n
favor of the p r e v i o u s q u e s t i o n say " a y e . "

Body:

Aye.

Mr. Speaker:

Opposed "no."
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Johnson.
I move p r e v i o u s

Body:

(None)

Mr. Speaker:

The motion carries. Back to sponsor for
summation.

Rep. Fox:

I think it's all been said. I urge your
support. Please vote for the bill.
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